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fUNCTlONJNG OF THE GATT SYSTEM 
COfflfflUf'\ication froca the Eur92ean Co,mu11ty 
The Punta del Este Declaration indicates that negotiations ehel,l aim ta 
develop understandings and arrangements to enhance · surveillance, improve 
overall effectiveness end decision•making and increase the contribution of: 
GATT to achieving greater coherenc·e in 9lobal econ.omic policy-making. 
While a separate consideration of ieeuee has beeh n.ecessary to organise the 
work of the Group, these three objectives cannot be dissociated from each 
other. The common thre.ad binding thein together ~a the need to strengthen 
the role of GATT through a rein~ot•cement of its policy dimension, which 
should complement but not substitute· .for ordinary ·.contractual activities. 
Any '-'nderstanding or arrangement which mey be developed shoula b,e ae·e,:,. as a 
contribution towards achieving the thre1t objectives of the negotiating 
ma.ndate. · 
With this ·commu,icat.ion, the European Community aims to contribu.te to the 
balanced progress in . the Negotieti.ng Group on those elements which are 
necessary for achieving globality in rebtion to the overall negotiating 
objective. Aa· the negotiating process evolves, end in light of the 
discussions in the Group, the EC intend~ to present further contributions 
on particular elements. rn this context the EC would wish to underline 
thet, · as was recognised in Punta de.l Este, a central object1_ve of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations is to foster concurrent action to s.trengthen the 
inter-relationships. between trade policies .and other economic policies, aa 
well as contributing · towards eff o·rts to improve the functioning of the 
international monetary system and the flow of resources ·to Cleveloping 
countries. Participants therefore hav~ every interest · in · avoiding a 
e1tuet1on where the reault.s of the Uruguay Round are· compromised •. 
I. Enhancing Surveillance in the GA-TT 
The objective of a Trade Policy, Review Mechanism would be to 1~rove 
transparency and acquire a better understanding of countries' polleies 
leading to a collective evslu.at1on~. It is therefore essential that 
reviews ere not considered as a form of'passlng Judgement oo countries' 
policies or a mechanism for the enfor.cement of rights and obligations, 
These latter functions properly correspond to· dispute-settlement 
procedures. At the same time, there is · a need to ·proceed· to a 
rationalisation of existing GATT. notification and aurveUlence 
mechanisms with a view to improviri~ compliance,· avoiding duplication or 
the creation of new layers of bureaucracy and maintaining the overall 
coherence and unity or the system. . 
A. Notification 
The 1979 framework Understandln~ already contains the p~1nc1ple that 
all trade measures should be notified to GATT and that, whenever 
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possible, this should be done· · in .a.dvanoe of implementation. , . The 
pl:'actice of reverse not1f1cet1on is also firmly established in GATT. 
Despite · this, there. is widespread concern · that t:he level·· of 
compliance' leaves. much to ba desired and th~t: the not1ttcet1on system ·.· 
continues to be excessively fragmented. Notification of trade· . 
measures is a basic transparency · requir.ement and·· ptovidea · the'· 
backbone for e.ffeotive aur'le.1lleoce •. The notification .systell) 'eh.ould: 
· · be compreheneiva end inelepen.dent of the legal JusUflcation claimed ·· 
for particular measures. Such a · system coula be.· baseci · on · the · 
follo·w1nq elementss · · · · 
1. 'A 1,1eneral obligation to notify new trade measure~, whether or ·a.· 
liberalising or protective · nature. · This general obligatia,, .. 
couched in as broad as poaa1ble terms, could be complemented· by 
an Illustrative List of' practices subject· to not.Hication, 
. . ,. . . ·, 
2. A common format for notifications, indicating·. the . minimum 
information which sho_uld be pro\lided with eech no~if'1cat1on. · 
J. All notifications sho.u~ci .be sent. to a Central Reeository, ao .a.a. 
to be able to ob~a!n, . at any point in time, a complete. picture 
both ·of countries' trade· P.olicies and of' general trends. · There ·· 
will be a need to examine the relationship between the ·new sya.t811l 
and notiflcetion/reportinq requirements established under 
particular GATT provisions .or decisions. 
4. Countries would be. requested; through the s·ecretaria.t~ to notify . 
measures for ioolusion · in the Central Repository·,· · Complla.noe · 
w1 th natl fication. requirements ·. should be sub,lec.t to re!J~ler · 
·man1tor1nq1ntheGATT.·· · · · .· ·· · ·.· 
. ' ' . 
· The above. procedural improvements w.ould have to be supported .by a 
poHt.ical commitment to inor·ease the transparency of t.rede p.ol19y . 
- which should apply to. all cor:,tractin,g parties.. Technical help 
could be offered to leas developed . countries . 1ri · order ,' to. 
facili.tate compliance with notification tequ1t'8mente. · As en -
immediate step, · the Se_cretarlat could be asked ta ca:rry out a 
study of how the propoeed new system would relate to 'existiniJ 
notification requirements, . as · well as ·drawing: up . poaaible 
criteria for. estebliehing ~ Illustrative List of practices 11'.td a 
common format for not1'1catioris. . . . . . · 
B. Trade policy revl.- mechanism, 
1. 
E0"d 
Country · Repprts. !t te essential that reports are £!11cy-
oriented, and. that the Common fo~mat focuses on en explaneron o.f 
the. objectives pursued,. ·the instruments· end measures adopted or 
discussed to further· these objectives,, the difficultiea feced, 
·either of an internal or. external nature; and the overall future 
direction of trade policy. · In order to proviae "early warning~, 
aiiJnificant proposals or impendi:ng. measures should be included in 
the l:'eporte. Since report1n~ constitutes a basic transparency 
exercise, no distinction should ba introctuced amon~ c.p.s which 
should be required to fulf ill the annual reporting ·requirement•· 
. . . ' . .. ·. . / .. 
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F'or the: purpose of the trade policy reviews the EC sh.ould. be. · 
considered as e single entity. 
2. Frequency of Me~lews. 
The Annual Agenda of Reviews could be drawn up on the basia of four · 
critel"ia; a) The tin:,e lapsed a1nce the last_ review. . A. . rigid 
cateqorisation of c.p.s should be _avoided.. Informal guidelines coul~: 
indicate the exp~cted frequency of reviews, which would be ·re_lated t(f'. · 
the share of world trade. A maximum interval for the oomplet~on of 
reviews should be established. b) The . need to · establish a-· 
gec,graphically and economically balanced programme of review~ · c) The · 
presence of major developments · ·1n ·· trade policy or··_ .the: tr~ln'1 
environment, which may Justify t.he neea- for an :urgent rev1e,w. without 
wa1tin.g for completion of the nor·mal cycle~ d) The conv.anienc:e f'.\Ot _-
to have_ reviews scheduled for· the same Seas.ion ii'\ which o.ther·. major-·. 
consultationa ere ta. tak.e place •. 
3. Conduct of reviews. 
The EC believes in the need or. having· both a weU..;preparad and· 
stru~tured discussion of policies end an open review in which all 
c.p.s would have the opportunity_ to participate. Another important 
conside.ration is to avoid the f ormetion of a Permanent Surveillance 
Body, · which could appear aa passing Ju.dgement on • coun.triea• 
policies. Preparation of reviewe could involve visits ·to capitals·, 
but the review should be conducted in Geneva and be open_ to the. · 
. participation of all c.p.s. A p,oeei_ble institutional &tructure would 
be special sessions of the Counci~ to carry out a nui:nber of country: 
reviews. .In order to increase public awarenees,_ reports, .. together-
with any comments,· should be made· public. . · 
4. Review of General Developments 
An ho.dzootal e><amination · of trends would fulfili a uaef'.ul function~ 
in particular to balance the rotating nature of country reviews.. Th_e . 
Secretariat could be asked to prepare, on the basis : of .ill reports·, .. 
an analysis of trade policy developments, which cou+d .serve as. a 
b'aeis for a better focused discussion in_ a einqle special s.ea.aion of _ 
the Council, which · would replace the· present biannual Review · 
Sessions. The objective of the reviews . a.houlci be to reach a · 
collective assessment of trad~ policy development, from whict, commoi:1 
guidance for collective behaviour may emerge. · . · :_ · 
5. Relationships between tracie policy reviews and existing surveilianc, 
mechanisms~ 
The Council should continue to represent the central mechanism 't'i:J 
monitor ordinary GATT ectiviti.es. _•· It also provide·s the natural forum 
for the discussion of 1ndiv1Cluel measures of particular concern- for 
./ ... 
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tha contractin1;1 parties. A proliferation of specialised GATT bodies~· 
as have sometimes been proposed in other. Negotiating Groups; shoulc;I 
be avoided with a view to maintaininq the unity . of the· system.: ·. The 
two specialised bodies now in existence ... th·e Committee on Trade and 
Development end · ttie Balance of' Payments Committee ~··•perform · the 
necessary function of mor,itorinq the applicatio.n of central GATT . 
provisions. It should be underlined t.hat the •nature. of: · country · · 
reviews end BO.P consultations would neceeearily be different,· eince · · 
the latter require en exsmtnstion of trade measures in th~ light of 
specific requirements ~or the application of a·major GATT el<cept1on: .. 
II. Increasing GATT contribution to achieving greater coherence 1o global. 
econolli.c pglicy-inald.ng . · . · . ·. · · · . 
£0"d 
When launching the Uruguay · Round negotiations, Ministers· were· 
particularly mindful of the inter-ac.tione between. tr~da, · mone.y • 
f1iiance end development.·· lnd_eed, the formulat.ion of . trade policy· 
cannot be dissociated f.rom the global economi~ environment an_d the 
incidence of· factors au.eh as the 'instability end misalignment of· 
exchange rates., external intialances or the high level of indebtedness 
of developing countries. S1m1larly, decision-makers in th.e financial. 
and development fields are 1ncreaalngly aw.are of the central. rol'e 
that trade plays in the . proces.s of international. economic 
adjustment. The need for close cooperation b.etween the. GATT and the 
IMf end the World Bank w.as elreaciy recognised in the· Charters o, the 
three 1nst1tut1ona, which refer· to common principles · and include 
among their shared objectives the promotion of the e)(p~sio,n of world 
· trade.· Institutional relationst,iipa are, therefore, not ~r:'1. e.nd in· 
themselves, but rather a means thr.ough wh.ich a policy frameW:Ol'k can 
be established so as to better ensure that· decision~ taken ~1thin the 
.~mbit of e~ch institution compleme.nt and. do not annui or oontradiot. 
each other. · 
· It needs to be stressed that the Urµguay Round negotiations.:· cannot . 
provide a solution to economic imbalances . whose· origin · lies . outd~e-
the trade f'1eld. Determined efforts to improve cooperation in the 
· monetar.y and finance fields are equally nec_easery. What the GAlT can · 
achieve, both on its owri end· .in coope_retion with other institutions, 
is to promote the role of tra.de policy in .. global eco.nomic 
policy-making, which should be an important ·element in . .facilitating · 
further progress in the convergence of economic policies. · ln order · · 
to achieve this objective~· G~TT should reinfor·ce its· capacity .. to 
consider trade policy in a broad economic context,. whicti . should 
become an important element of country and IJeneral reviews. Thia 
reinforcement will have. to take plece both at a:n operational level, 
main°ly · through an . increase in the resources avail.able · to the· 
Secret a.r let, and at a po lie y level, through more regular M1n1etedal 
involvement. · · · · · 
' ' ' 
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In order to assess how c·ooperetion could be improved between the 
institutions, the EC considers that the Group could co.ncentrate on 
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three areas in which. · the . interactions between trade and. othe.r · 
policies are manifests· 
a) On the basis of GA TT' a Article XV, procedure a for Cc)(lper.ation · 
have been develope.d when. the GATT 8)(emines trade restricUona , 
applied for balance of payments purposes, ·. yet despite the fact .· 
that the r11Jhts and obligations of contractin-J. parties will be· · 
affected there are no equivelent procedures when the IMF takes 
decisions over exohan1Je restrictions. · · · 
. . . .· ·. 
b) The increased ernphas.ia on atruo,tural adjuetmen.t has res.ult•o ii:,·. 
trade policy issues being regularly discussed by the !MF end tt,e 
~orld Bank. Thls is particularly the .case for. Article IV 
consultations under. the I~ Charter. · Convereely, macroeconomic.· 
and development policies are regularly considered it) GATT fqra. 
and will be an important feature of trade policy. reviews. Thia.· 
reciprocal interest has not yet been sufficiently reflected · 1n 
the organisation of surveil~ence ectivitie.a by each inetltution. 
c) The financing activities of the IMt and World Bank in relation· to. 
LOCe are no longer limited to · short•term · BOP adjustment · and 
project lendiniJ. ·1n recent years, several developing countries 
have 1ntroducee1 major trade · policy reforms .. in· the context of. 
structul"al adjustment programmes. At. present, the · G.I\TT has 
little information ebout · the content -of thes.e progtamn:iee, which . · 
hes limited' its capacity to support and encouralJe trade , reforms:. 
The above set o.f' activities · suggests that . there is · a need ··to· 
establish closer working· relationships betwe.en the three mult·ilater.al 
institutions of an inf'ormetional end ·advisory k1nd. Specific.•.lly · it, 
can be sui~gested that: · · · · 
- The procedurea for mutual consultations between the IMr. and the 
GATT. on the . use of trade. and ·excha.nge restrictions should 'be· . 
reinforced. The ex_amiri.ation · of Article . XV. in the GATT Articles· 
· G.roup will be relevant in·. this respect. ·- ·. ·. . . .. . 
- There should be closer cooperation, in par~iculer with the !Mr, on. 
the schectuling of surveillance exercises and the uee or each 
other' a surveillance information. In this context 1 · t~ present· 
role of GATT in the Interim and Development Commit.tees should. be·· 
enhanced .and the IMF' and W.orld Bank could be inviteel to participate: 
in the proposed Trade. Policy Annual. Review of 'GA TT. · · · · 
. . . . 
Th.e confidentlelUy of the relationships between t~ I-Mf /Worid Bank 
and me.mber governments ie · particularly sensitive i!'l. the . oaae of 
loan · programme.s .. and ·. should not be : preJ,udiced.. Thla 
notwithstanding, · th~ GATT Secretariat could perform an . l(llportant 
advisory role on ,how:the contents of a programme could.be madmiaa<S 
in the GATT rnultilet.er·al framework. The GATT should consider 
.. / .. 
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mechanisms through which cred1.t will' be 'qiven to LOCs-1 undertakin«.1 
trade policy reforf!!s and possible contributions fr.om other o.p.s 
cari be assessed. · · · 
. . 
· - The se~ting up of a GATT · 11e1son office in Weehingtor1 eho~ld t'lelp 
to facilitate closer cooperation betwee.n the staff of the three 
institutions. 
The closer working relet'ionship that would result from the above 
suggestions would provide the basis for further· institutional 
developments, which could be ·considered et a later sta~.. G,1.ven 
the need for joint action in .several areas, t~ work of this Group . 
would require a close GA TT .dial~.ue w1 th the IMF and the World ·.· 
Bank. · 
The above comments are f'ocused on the 1netitutio.nal aspects of the · 
trade-monetary link and· the Conmunity reserves the right to p.reaen-t 
a further contribution,· as appropriate, on the· broader 1.ssues wM:~h 
arise in this field~. · · · 
III• Improving the overall eff'ectiveneu and decision-making of the· GAlT' 
as an liistitution · 
L0"d 
The concepts of 11 effeot1veneaa11 and '11 decision~making11 are cieedy · 
broader than the question of. ministerial participation wh'ieh 'is .. 
idenU f ied in the Negotiating · Man.date as one possible instrument 
through which these objectives may be achieved. . At. the. same: time, 
the role of Ministers is linked ·to the ·reinforcement of the GATT •s 
policy dimension and needs t<J be · considered, therefot'e, _in relation 
to the three n~otiating objectives~ · · 
A. Effectivene88 
Improvements in effective.neas will ten.d to res.ult from prOp<>sal.• 
to establish 8 review mechani!:5m and. . to Streng.then . the '. .. · 
relationships with othe..r . international organlsatlonei. The wor.k ·. 
of other Negotiating Groupe w.111' .also be. rele:,Jant to ·8lCp,and. the. 
coverage of GATT activities. · · · 
Another important consideration will be the eff toiency of ·the 
institution. Improvements· in · the not1ficet1cin .. ·. eyetem .and· 
proposals to . maintain the overall coherence of the.· ,GA fT sys_tem . 
should contribute towards this objective. · · · · 
The Secretariat and the Director General would have. a central 
role to play in relation to the mans1:1ement· .of the ~otiflcation 
system, the preparation af . tr.ade 'policy I'eviewe ano · the 
establishment of working relationships with the IMf' and the Wo,rld . 
Bank. lrl order to fulfill these functions, there will have to be · 
a significant increase· in. th.e resources availa.bl& to. the 
Secretariat~ A particular · need appears to be to _potentiate 
qeographical desks to enable the· Secretariat to perform a regular 
monitoring function· an.d faoilitate cooperation with ttie !Mf /~ 
at a.ff. 
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e. Decision-making 
The principle of consensus is .an important element of coheeiort. 
· necessary to reach decisions which engatJe all contrac.ting partie:s. 
F'or minor decisions, such as those of an administrative nature or ror 
' the information gathering' exercise,' greater flexibility may 'be 
needed~ It would be difficult, however, to define · in advanoe hard 
and fast rules on when the principle of consensus should apply. It 
is preferable therefore to rely on an evolution of practices which· 
should leed to the elimination of unnecessary- blockages. · ·· · 
Rules and practices. which have evolved for the .contractual activities 
of GATT should not neciessa,rily .apply to the trade policy review· 
~cheniem. The principle that reports will not have to be adopted 
but simply taken note of shoulcj be affirmed. Reservations about .any 
particu'lar concepts in a report could always be expressed through 
formal etetements. f'or this principle to apply, it is essentiel that 
reports are not conceived as a judgement on countries• policies. 
c. H1niaterial participation 
•·: . 
In order to identify the purposes·· end functions or· rniniete.rlel 
participation in GATT, there is a need to define t~ role whfoh 
m1n1eters may play in relation to the different · elements of our 
negotiating mandate: 
a) Examination of general trade polic~ developmentsi Discusslone at 
· Ministerial level of the. major t~emes identified in the annual 
process of reviews,· ae highlighted by the Secretariat Report. on 
General Developments, would be · a major coot!'ibution to 
reinforcing the commitment to the multilateral tra<ling eystem. 
These · c:11scueaions would help to pron:iote . a greater . political 
awareness of the functioning of the · GATT syst.em and signal areaa 
in which action by the Contracting Parties may be necessary. · 
b) Effectheness and decision-mekiri~s The effectivense of GATT 
would hardly be increased if Ml~ls ers w.ere to be involved in the-
routine process of decis1on•mak1n9. The role. of M1n1etera a~ould 
be one of providing the guidance and orientation which ere 
necessary to sustain oroinery GATT activities, a& w~U as. 
launching major initiatives to provide GATT with a &enee o.f 
dynamism; The effectiveness .and. credibility or GATT .would ·eleo 
be increased if Ministers were to assume publicly the defen.ce and 
promotion of the principl.es of the multilateral trading system 
and briny GATT ect1vft1es into· greater· prominence i,:i domestic and · 
international arena. This should help to overcome th.e current 
dissociation between •i internal" end "extern.al" perceptions of the 
value,of GATT in international t1"8de relations~ 
.. / .. 
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c) Coherences Discussions on the interactions between trade· policy 
and the global adj ust.ment · process need · to be conducted et · a 
political level. Minist~rs can also send the si~r,els ·which are 
necessary to forestall sudden trade disturbances and engage in a: .·. 
policy dialogue wi.th other institut.iona. ·· · · 
The EC believes th.at the reinf or.cement of .GA TT' a policy dimen·a1on · 
would require a more · regular ministerial involvement than · h.aa 
been ttie· case in the past. A clear understanding · or the 
funotiona that Ministers would be celled to assume· wo.uld 
f acilitete the discussion of· the · particular forms "in which 
Ministerial pre·sence can be established within GATT. 
